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ABSTRACT
I review in this paper how J. L. Austin relativizes the question of truth to 
contexts of the use of sentence-tokens, especially to the specifi c purposes 
with which a given user employs them. This has the consequence that truth 
becomes more matter of only being ‘roughly’ accurate, relative to a certain 
uses of sentence-tokens, rather than an inherent property of sentences in 
their putative correspondence to the world ‘out there’. Austin’s unease 
with the way philosophers have traditionally handled the question of 
truth thus stands out independently of his trademark thesis of verediction 
taking precedence over verum, the latter only taking its strength from the 
authority commanded by the one behind the former. This in turns opens 
up several new avenues of research, a fact that goes to prove that Austin 
has a lot to teach future generations of researchers.
Key-words: J. L. Austin; truth/falsity; descriptions; France as a 
hexagon.
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RESUMO 
Examino neste trabalho como J. L. Austin relativiza a questão da verdade 
a contextos de enunciações, em especial a propósitos específi cos para 
os quais o usuário as emprega. Isso redunda em que a verdade se torna 
algo de ordem mais ou menos acurada, relativamente a determinadas 
enunciações, e não um atributo inerente a sentenças em sua putativa 
correspondência ao mundo ‘lá fora’. Assim, o desconforto que Austin 
sentia em relação à forma como os fi lósofos tradicionalmente lidaram 
com a questão da verdade desponta como independente da sua celebrada 
tese de veredicção ter precedência sobre verum, sendo que este se legitima 
graças à autoridade de quem está por trás daquela. Isso, por sua vez, abre 
novos caminhos para pesquisa, fato que comprova que Austin ainda tem 
muito que ensinar futuras gerações de pesquisadores.
Palavras-chave: J. L. Austin; verdade/falsidade; descrições; França 
como hexágono.
1. A geometrical nickname and what it has to do with 
philosophy
A posting on the Internet, dated March 20, 2013, a chance fi nding 
by me, a self-confessed occasional net surfer, read:
At some point during my fi rst year in France I was watching the news 
when I became very confused. The news anchor was referring to 
something as “l’hexagone.” Up until that point, I had been completely 
unaware that France was nicknamed the Hexagon. Despite being 
quite skilled in shapes when I was [in] elementary school, I did not 
immediately make the connection between France and a hexagon. Yet, 
when I looked again, I saw that indeed the country has six sides of 
roughly equal distance. (http://howtoliveinfrance.com/french-culture/
why-is-france-nicknamed-the-hexagon/)
Upon navigating further on the Internet, yet another surprising fi nd: a 
reference to an academic paper entitled ‘The idea of the French hexagon’ 
(Smith 1969), where the author declares right at the outset: “Though 
l’Hexagone has only within the last two decades become recognized as 
synonymous with “France,” the idea of France as a hexagon has a history 
whose length and variety will prove surprising to most.” 
 Why Austin still matters
585
32.3
2016
My attention was captured by what I instantly recognized as 
something that appears on the very front cover of the edition I have 
in my home library of J. L. Austin’s classic book How to Do Things 
with Words (Austin, 1978 [1962]), a detail that had always aroused my 
curiosity, despite some discussion about it in the fi nal pages (more on this 
towards the end of this paper). Here it appears as an affi rmative sentence 
that says ‘France is hexagonal’ enclosed within one of the thought-
bubbles emanating from a man seated on a stool, all hunched up and 
presumably lost in his thoughts (philosophical musings?). Clive Collins, 
the cover illustrator, it seems to me, was extraordinarily successful in 
capturing the essence and the most important insight of the great English 
philosopher (not always adequately appreciated as such in the literature) 
as well as giving us a vital clue to his uncanny, often unsettling style of 
going about tackling philosophical themes – his abiding, often unsettling, 
sense of humour, for instance (Rajagopalan, 2000 [2010]a).
In what remains of this paper, I shall try to take up separately each 
of these two issues, namely, Austin’s philosophical message and his 
peculiar way of putting it across and then proceed to show why, in my 
view, we have still a lot to learn from him. 
2. Austin’s philosophical message
The ‘hexagonality’ of France speaks directly to an important 
philosophical theme that was very dear to Austin. And the way he 
positions himself in respect of it is crucial to an understanding of what 
he was trying to get at. To begin with, let us grant that it has nothing 
to do with France, nor, for that matter, the supposed hexagonality of 
its territorial extension. Another example that readily comes to mind is 
the reference to Italy as boot-shaped, utilized by many cartoonists for 
a long time, one of the most recent ones being the one by Pfohlmann 
in Der Spiegel, where she makes an acerbic commentary on the fate 
of refugees desperately fl eeing from war-ravaged countries of north-
Africa by showing a boot-shaped Italy threatening to kick them back 
to where they came from. 
The question that hexagonal France and boot-shaped Italy bring to 
the fore is how or if at all the issue of truth has any bearing on them. To 
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take the specifi c case of the use made of the analogy by Clive Collins, 
does the sentence ‘France is a hexagon’ admit of being evaluated as 
to its veracity or not. And if the answer is ‘yes’, well, is it or does it 
qualify as true or false (as it has to be one or the other, if we play by 
the rules of standard truth-conditional, two-valued logic)? 
The question posed above is not all that as simple as it might strike 
at fi rst sight. France is a hexagon, depending on how you look at it 
and, perhaps more importantly, what your reasons for doing it are. If 
you are, say, an artist interested in designing a catchy logo for a French 
state enterprise, you may wish to represent the country as a hexagon, 
availing yourself of the vague similarity to the familiar polygon-shape 
in geometry that a photograph of the country taken from a satellite 
high up in the sky would reveal. But one does not have to stretch one’s 
imagination to think of cases where such a crude analogy will not be 
of any use whatsoever, in fact, might even land you in deep trouble!
3. Austin on truth
Towards the end of his book How to Do Things with Words (Austin, 
1978 [1962]), Austin surprises his readers with his (sincere?) confession 
to having had, all along, “an inclination to play Old Harry with” two 
age-old distinctions, one of which was “the true/false” fetish (the other, 
viz. “value/fact’, does not interest us at this moment, for, among other 
things, the fact that its resolution depends inter alia on what one decides 
about true/false, the distinction that putatively yields ‘facts’).  
In his famous Aristotelian society presentation, Austin (1950: 117) 
was straight to the point (well, in his own peculiar fashion!) when he 
writes:
 ‘What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. 
Pilate was in advance of his time. For ‘truth’ itself is an abstract noun, 
a camel, that is, of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye 
even of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand: we ask 
ourselves whether Truth is a substance... or a quality... or a relation... But 
philosophers should take something more nearly their own size to strain 
at. What needs discussing rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word 
‘true.’ In vino, possibly, ‘veritas,’ but in a sober symposium ‘verum.’
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And, later on, he goes to observe something that brings us very 
close to where we started off from:
Is it true or false that Belfast is north of London? That the galaxy 
is the shape of a fried egg? That Beethoven was a drunkard? That 
Wellington won the battle of Waterloo? There are various degrees and 
dimensions of success in making statements: the statements fi t the facts 
always more or less loosely, in different ways on different occasions 
for different intents and purposes.
The truth or falsity of x being to the north of y depends on the 
location of the observer with respect to x and y. But what about 
Beethoven being a drunkard or the Duke of Wellington having come out 
victorious from the battle of Waterloo? Surely, these are run-of-the-mill 
declaratives that would be regarded as full-blooded truth-bearers or, 
in Austin’s terms, constatives. Yet, what Austin suggests is that there 
are no hard and fast criteria that would help us determine whether they 
are true or false. Truth and falsity is a gradient concept. And so is the 
idea of constativity. 
Note that this ultimate undermining of the very concept of 
constativity – let us not forget, the one bedrock of certainty there was 
when Austin set out on his long intellectual journey – is different from, 
and even more damaging than, the idea of all constatives turning out 
to be, and to have been all along, performatives masquerading as such 
(the metaphor, let us not forget, is Austin’s). What the claims made in 
the last quote underscore is that the very attempt to defi ne constatives 
independently by means of an appeal to the criterion of truth vs. 
falsehood is doomed to fl ounder. 
4. Austin: an analytic philosopher with a continental 
outlook
It is in his treatment of the concept of ‘truth’ that Austin reveals 
himself as a veritable ‘dog in the manger’ of Austro-Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy. It is also here that his affi nity with the Continental 
philosophy becomes most striking. Central to the Continental approach 
to the question of truth, one that pervades several prominent thinkers 
of the likes of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Bourdieu and so forth, is that 
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truth just cannot be viewed as the imminent property of anything. 
Austin’s remark that in virtue of its being “[…] an abstract noun, a 
camel, that is, of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye 
even of a grammarian,” it is futile to look for truth in any one object or 
a cluster of objects, available for everyone to feast their eyes on. For the 
continental philosopher, therefore, rather than worry about truth itself, 
it is much more worth the while to ask what ancillary circumstances 
make it the case that a given object (call it a ‘fact’) becomes a candidate 
for truth value ascription. 
Austin’s answer to the last question is of a piece with what his 
colleagues on the other side of the Channel characteristically think: 
“it depends.” It depends on a number of attendant circumstances. Who 
makes the claim, for what purpose and under what constraints? France 
can be truthfully a hexagon and Italy no less truthfully boot-shaped, if 
you are a designer interested in coming up with a logogram for a new 
State undertaking. But for some other person, say an army general or 
a geophysicist, well, it is a different story. 
5. Why Austin’s take on truth has a bearing on the whole 
thesis about speech acts and all the rest
It should not take a great stretch of the imagination to perceive that 
what Austin has to say on truth has resonances far beyond the resolution 
of this age-old issue in philosophy. So the Jesting Pilate should not be 
allowed to get away with it all. To shift gears, one has to take the bull 
by its horns and see what consequences it has on what Austin says (is 
said to have said) about a number of other key things.
The fi rst thing to recognize about Austin’s discussion about the 
nature of truth is that it permeates a number of other cornerstones of his 
conceptual architecture. Notice fi rst of all that Austin (1961[1979]a:32) 
was never at ease with the very concept of a concept, declaring that 
he had no clue as to whether they were a priori or a posteriori, simply 
because he had no idea as to what concepts were to begin with, hence 
a fortiori obviating the possibility of any discussion of the dilemma. 
Also, it is important to realize that Austin’s uncertainty as to what 
a genuine truth-bearer can be and how one can ever know when and if 
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at all one has isolated it directly affects the identity of the object one 
has chosen to zero in on. As he himself puts it, “[t]he truth or falsity 
of statements is affected by what they leave out or put in and by their 
being misleading and so on.” (pp. 144-145). And readers of the text 
of How to Do Things with Words are all too familiar with Austin’s 
successive attempts and fi ascos in trying to identify his prized object: 
the illocutionary act. The following passage culled from Lecture XII 
leaves no doubt whatsoever in this regard:
The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to the 
doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary in the total speech act as the 
special theory to the general theory. And the need for the general theory 
arises simply because the traditional ‘statement’ is an abstraction, 
an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity. (Austin 1978
[1962]: 148)
As Derrida (1982: 322) remarked: “Austin had to free the analysis 
of the performative from the authority of the value of truth, from 
the opposition true/false, at least in its classical form, occasionally 
substituting it for the value of force, of difference of force (illocutionary 
or perlocutionary force).”
But, then, hot on the heels of this claim comes what Austin himself 
calls one of a series of “fi reworks”: “The total speech act in the total 
speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, 
we are engaged in elucidating.” 
But this “only actual phenomenon” remains for ever elusive, 
although Austin never gives up the chase – a gesture which famously 
made Max Black exclaim whether a most suitable sub-title for Austin’s 
ouvre would not have been ‘In Pursuit of a Vanishing Distinction.’ 
(Black, 1969: 401). Incidentally, the phrase “vanishing distinction” is 
Austin’s own and he uses it while teasing out the several subtle nuances 
of the term ‘circumstances’. Here is what he says: “This again is a 
roughish and vanishing distinction, yet not without importance (in, 
say, the law).” (Austin, 1962 [1978]: 35)
But what I wish to call the readers’ attention is to the bit that says 
“and so is its traditional truth or falsity.” Even as he recognizes full well 
that truth is an abstraction, an ideal, Austin sees it as a quarry worth 
pursuing. The question is: what is the point of doing it? For many of his 
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readers, the idea of pursuing an object one knows in advance will never 
be within his grasp would make no sense. It is rather like reenacting 
the pointless life-routine of the mythical fi gure Sisyphus, condemned 
to roll a boulder uphill, only to watch it roll back down again.  
It is truly amazing to see Austin do it time and time again. Early 
on, on page 13, we have Austin saying: “So far then we have merely 
felt the fi rm ground of prejudice slide away beneath our feet. But now 
how, as philosophers, are we to proceed? One thing we might go on to 
do, of course, is to take it all back: another would be to bog, by logical 
stages, down”. 
But the English philosopher wouldn’t give up all that easily without 
a fi ght either. Then on page 67, we see him exclaim ‘The thing seems 
hopeless from the start […]’. Again, on page 91, another moment of 
stock-taking: “It is time to make a fresh start on the problem.” On 
page 123, we fi nd: “Many of you will be getting impatient at this 
approach – and to some extent justifi ably. You will say ‘Why not cut 
the cackle?’”
“It is important,” he says, “to take the speech situation as a whole.” 
(p. 138). And on page 148, we have what turns out be essentially a 
variation and at the same time a most categorical and defi nitive reiteration 
of the same idea: the one, cited earlier, where he says “the total speech 
act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, 
in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.” 
This brings us to another crucial question that surfaces time and 
again in Austin’s writings: how do we lay ours hands on our ultimate 
object of enquiry and, even more importantly, how can ever be certain 
as to whether one has managed to capture it? 
An excerpt from page 115 should throw some light on Austin’s 
thinking on this last question:
We should not, if we were to insist for some reason and in some sense 
on ‘going back’ from the illocution to the phonetic act […], be going 
back to a minimum physical action via the chain of its consequences, 
in the way we supposedly go back from the death of the rabbit to 
the movement of the trigger fi nger. The uttering of noises may be a 
consequence (physical) of the movement of the vocal organs, the breath, 
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&c.: but the uttering of a word is not a consequence of the uttering of 
a noise, whether physical or otherwise.
The above passage gives us an important insight into a fundamental 
tenet of Austin’s thinking, one that may be come across in the thinking 
of many others who frequented the Oxford group that came to be known 
as linguistic philosophers (as distinct from philosophers of language) or 
Ordinary Language Philosophers. Indeed it is surprising that passages 
like this have simply been glossed over by many readers of Austin for 
reasons that do not concern us here (Rajagopalan, 2000 [2010]b).
The tenet mentioned in the foregoing paragraph has to do 
with Austin’s fi rm conviction that all attempts to trace complex, 
phenomena of interpretation to something deep down, solid as a 
bedrock, be it concrete or in any other sense ‘irrefutable’ is bound 
to fail. The ‘movement of the trigger fi nger’ to which he makes a 
reference in the passage cited above is part of an elaborate argument 
he marshals to debunk all attempts to look for such bedrocks to base 
one’s interpretations. Here’s the gist of the argument he produces in 
his essay ‘Truth’. Under what circumstances can one be absolutely 
certain that x murdered y? None, says Austin. To say that ‘x murdered 
y’ it is not enough to show that y died, not even that y died as a result 
of a bullet fi red by x. Not even the fact that there was a witness at the 
crime scene ready to vouch that the bullet came off the barrel of the 
gun in virtue of ‘movement of the trigger fi nger’ of the accused. Even 
such a movement could have been the result of a nervous tic, and so 
on. Austin’s whole point is that attributing deliberate intention to the 
accused (which is what the law demands for the killing to be typifi ed 
as a murder and not manslaughter) can never be a done deal. There is 
always a fatal slip between the cup and the lip. 
It is clear that Austin’s stance on this crucial, million-dollar 
question has a ripple effect on a number of issues dear to both linguists 
and philosophers. First and foremost, there is the question of what 
constitutes a factum or datum or whatever one wants to call it. Naïve 
empiricists are given to thinking that raw data are there everywhere, 
ready for the theorist latch onto and start theorizing about them. But 
then what are raw data? Many would say they are raw because they have 
been, as it were, untouched by human hands. In other words, there is 
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no human participation in isolating them, let along ‘fabricating’ them. 
In other words, they were always already there as physical entities of 
some sort, long before any sentient being had the idea of contemplating 
them. 
It is precisely here that a fatal fl aw in the whole argument lies – so 
Austin would argue. For the physical reality that is argued to be there 
independently of the sentient mind is only available to us through an 
interpretation and this interpretation invariably amounts to an act of 
intervention. Just the way it is in the case of Austin’s analysis of the 
alleged murder and tracing it back to the ‘movement of the trigger 
fi nger’ of the accused. 
All this takes us right back to where we set off from: the 
‘hexagonality’ of France. Here is how Austin goes about discussing 
the issue on page 143:
Suppose that we confront ‘France is hexagonal’ with the facts, in 
this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like 
up to a point; of course I can see what you mean by saying it is true 
for certain intents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking 
general, perhaps, but not for a geographer.
And he goes to conclude: “It is just rough, and that is the right and 
fi nal answer to the question of the relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to 
France. It is a rough description; it is not a true or false one”.
Austin is saying that, even in the case of declarative, statement-
making sentences (i.e. sentences qua sentences, not as their enunciations 
as speech acts) – often considered the safe haven of truth and falsity, 
the idea of their being always, invariably and necessarily either true 
or false does not hold. In the ultimate analysis, then, Austin is putting 
forward a powerful thesis that has far-reaching implications for standard 
truth-conditional semantics which many see as capable of serving as 
the foundation of a theory of meaning. Austin’s whole point is that, no 
matter how hard you try, the question of truth will always be subject to 
a number of presuppositions about the world, about what aspect of the 
world we wish to focus on and under what conditions we approach it, 
with what intent and so on. In his own words (p. 147): “This is a wide 
fi eld and certainly will not lead to a simple distinction of ‘true’ and 
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‘false’; nor will it lead to a distinction of statements from the rest, for 
stating is only one among very numerous speech acts of illocutionary 
class”.
Incidentally, this is just where Searle (1969) made his most 
egregious mistake. In seeking to posit a propositional content at the 
very hear of a speech act, in spite of Austin’s repeated and unequivocal 
warnings against it (cf. Rajagopalan, 2010).
All interpretations are inherently and irremediably fallible (at the 
very least, liable to contestation) and so too, all interventions, in spite 
of the best of intentions with which they may be carried out, run the risk 
of backfi ring or being counterproductive. But here is where the crucial 
question comes up – one that prevents the whole issue from going 
down the slippery slope all the way down the hill to total skepticism 
and most stultifying relativism.
There is plenty of textual evidence as well as fi rst-hand witness 
reports from those who knew him personally to the effect that Austin 
was in no way eager to present a fully-fl edged doctrine about anyone of 
the subjects he addressed along the way. A most eloquent testimony to 
his desire to relegate the outstanding problems to his listeners/readers 
comes in his parting words at the end of lecture/chapter XII. Here he 
says one of the things he has no interest in doing – although, in a way, 
he has ended up actually doing or at least gesturing towards that – is 
‘producing a programme, that is, saying what ought to be done rather 
than doing it” (p. 164). But then he hastens to remedy matters, adding 
“I should very much like to think that I have been sorting out a bit the 
way things have already begun to go and are going with increasing 
momentum in some parts of philosophy, rather than proclaiming an 
individual manifesto.”
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper my main concern has been to drive home the crucial 
point, not often adequately appreciated by Austin readers and, to be 
sure, often painstakingly skirted by linguists who otherwise pay lip 
service to the English philosopher and his ground-breaking ideas, 
that the question of truth is at the very centre of his whole thinking. 
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It is not for nothing that, very early on in his career, he undertook a 
translation into English of Gottlob Frege’s 1884 book Die Grundlagen 
der Arithmetik and published it under the title of The Foundations 
of Arithmetic. As is widely known, Frege was laying the founding 
ideas of what later became known as ‘logicism’ – the thesis that all 
of mathematics should ultimately be reducible to logic. In choosing 
to translate that work, it is clear that Austin was somehow struggling 
with the whole idea of logic as the ultimate loadstar. No wonder that he 
targeted truth as the chief quarry in his own philosophical musings.
Unfortunately, many scholars still work under the illusion that 
it is possible to give Austin due credit for having drawn everyone’s 
attention to the existence of locutions that fl y in the face of truth-value 
evaluations, while at the same time going back to their business as usual, 
which is confi ning their own attention to familiar truth-bearers – that 
Austin famously re-baptized ‘constatives’. As it happens, Austin’s 
ultimate coup de grâce consisted in making it clear to all and sundry 
that there are no such things as constatives. In so doing, he was pulling 
the carpet from beneath the feet of all those contended themselves 
doing familiar truth-conditional semantics and illuding themselves 
by thinking that they were taking care of everything of interest to 
meaning-making in language.
But then, having pointed out that, we must once again take up his 
cautionary words mentioned at the end of the previous section – against 
the idea of proclaiming a whole new manifesto for philosophy. Austin 
refuses in these words to be interested in inaugurating a new paradigm. 
It is clear that he had no empire-building ambitions. His whole purpose 
in pursuing philosophical themes was to play a gentleman’s parlour 
game, though his style, his demeanour, his ‘I-don’t-care-two-hoots-
about-what-others-might-think’ manner of tackling philosophical 
questions – without, at the same time, sacrifi cing his commitment to 
rigour and seriousness in the conduct of doing philosophy did earn him 
a formidable entourage of doting admirers and enthusiastic followers 
(and, no doubt, die-hard critics too). 
In these parting words, Austin was laying down a whole new 
approach to doing philosophy and, by extension, doing academics. 
Against the much commoner practice of taking a great thinker’s ideas 
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wholesale and working out its real import for the rest of one’s life, 
Austin is exhorting his readers to work with his ideas, extending them 
in ways he had not had the time or opportunity to develop, introducing 
along the process changes where they are deemed necessary and 
dispensing with ideas that no longer seem appealing – in effect, making 
important interventions. 
In other words, Austin is averse to the whole idea of anyone wishing 
to take his incursions into linguistic philosophy as the last word. He did 
not believe in any such thing as a last word. “Neither a be-all nor an end 
all be,” was the motto he chose for a sober philosophy (1958 [1979]
b: 271). For Austin, philosophizing was a collective enterprise, where 
every newcomer is required to tread the path cleared up for him/her 
by the ones who preceded them. All he or she can do is to take up the 
discussion from where the others left it. In his own distinctive fashion, 
he also saw the business of philosophy as essentially a gentleman’s 
parlour game. This last point was what most strikingly set him off from 
Nietzsche with whom he otherwise shared many a trait in common 
(Rajagopalan, 1998 [2010]). 
Austin’s philosophy is multifaceted and open to many further 
explorations. It is in this sense that Austin still matters!
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